

Critically evaluate the utility of the US use of force in the (2003) Iraq war

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Preface

The war in Iraq is a significant event for removing Saddam Hussein from power. Furthermore, an American strategy built around the principle of regime change would have used the utility of force against Iraq to change the regime of Iraq. Although, according to many studies the USA sought to support democracy in Iraq but in fact they did not bring any real democracy to Iraq. The USA attacked Iraq not because of democracy or destruction of mass weapons, the reason was to get natural resources. Consequently, after invasion of Iraq the situation became even worse to promote and install democracy due to internal conflict and violence.

Introduction:

The utility of military force has been the most prominent in terms of political objectives of stability, economic development, democratisation and respect for human rights since the end of the cold war (Egnell, 2008). After the end of the cold war in 1989, the utility of military force has been the focus of more consideration (Angstrom and Duyvesteyn, 2010). Therefore, military operations are likely to continue in the near future. It continues to play a significant role in these operations. However, according to General Sir Rupert Smith the utility of military force is a solution "for a wide range of problems for which it was not originally intended or configured" (Egnell, 2008: p3). Rupert Smith (cited in Burton and Nagl, 2008) also argues that the utility of force is less practical and beneficial in wars between the people. In this regard, the utility of force against Iraq was justified by the USA and Britain in December 1998, due to Iraq's agreement to accept international armaments monitoring and removing weapons of mass destruction (Weller, 1999, p.2). In Iraq, the utility of force appears to be more limited (Duyvesteyn 2008). Before starting the war in 2001, the Bush government re-evaluated the possibility costs and risks of removing Saddam Hussein from power and changing the regime of Iraq (Metz, 2010). Saddam Hussein and his regime was described by the Bush as a "serious threat" to the Middle East (Danchev and Macmillan, 2005: p35). Thus, the utility of force used in Iraq in 2003 to attain an operational objective; for example, to remove Saddam Hussein from power and his Ba'ath regime apparatus and also to destruct the Iraqi forces (Smith, 2006: p.271).

This essay will critically set the argument of the utility of force in the Iraq war, which was launched by the United States since 2003. Therefore, the argument of the paper will be as follow. Although, the United States succeeded in removing the local and regional threat of Saddam's regime by means of force, the US still did not use force effectively because the consequences of the Iraq war were counterproductive in terms of the lack of democracy, political instability, Kurdish issues and the escalation of violence and insurgency.

The utility of force in Iraq would be viewed in some important facts such as removing Saddam Hussein from power and changing the regime of Iraq by using the force of American strategy (Antic, 2009, p.p.88-113). In addition, according to Weller (1999, p.1), one of the aims of utility of force was to reduce Saddam's ability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction and control his power of threatening the world. Furthermore, the utility of force during and after the war was ineffective because the internal conflict did not end between citizens and terrorist attacks and insurgents were increasing day by day (Olsen, 2011). Hence, Duyvesteyn (2008) claims that the utility of force has four purposes, which are damaging, pressure, discouragement and control. Although, Kurdish people being Iraqi civilians, obtained many objectives after the war such as a semi-autonomous region, many issues were generated because of the poor political conditions between Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi central government of Al-Maliki. Therefore, this means that the US use of force rather generated political instability and semi civil-war in Iraq due to the different political parties and the fight for Iraqi resources such as oil (Cordesman and Khazai, 2013).

The utility of the US use of force in the (2003) Iraq war

1-The lack of democracy:

Regime change was significant for spreading peace in the Middle East generally and for the Iraqi government particularly. Many studies have found that the purpose of the utility of force was to achieve some factors such as establishing democracy in Iraq. America tried to support democracy in terms of improving a peaceful society (Antic, 2009, p.p.88). Furthermore, President Bush and his neo-conservative allies believe that attacking countries is helpful to spread the democracy. Therefore, spreading democracy with using the military force is not a successful tactic to shape democracy in Iraq or in any other places (Mearsheimer, 2005, p.p.1-2). However, The USA did not bring a real democracy to Iraq and the real purpose of the invaders was not to organise the democracy (Antic, 2009, p.p.88-113). Furthermore, the USA invaded Iraq neither because Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction nor because of democracy, but their goal was for oil (Antic, 2009, p.p.88-113). In other words, the USA did not realise the minimum obligation for democracy during 2001 to 2004. According to a Gallup Poll (cited in Antic, 2009) in Baghdad from October 2003, only 1 percent of Iraqis thought that the USA invaded Iraq in order to establish democracy, and only 5 percent thought that the USA wanted to help Iraqis. The

majority of respondents thought that motives for intervention were to control Iraqi oil or to reorganize Middle East according to the US interests. Hence, (Antic, 2009, p.p.88-113) states that the real purpose of the fighters was not to establish democracy but it was for controlling the natural resources. As a result, the violence on Iraq was not justified and the people were not happy about the invasion of Iraq by external troops. (Antic, 2009, p.p.88-113).

On the whole, it could be argued that Iraq lacks the means of democracy because shaping democracy was problematic through using military force because it was not a successful tactic to build democracy in this way. Because if the utility of force was successful in shaping democracy, the current president of Iraq, Nori Al-Maliki would not control the Iraqi government according to his own interests and would not exploit his people such as ignoring the rights of Kurds and Sunni Arabs. In addition, the US use of force generated a divided country without democracy because Al-Maliki's reign brought about many conflicts among people. Therefore, the utility of force could not achieve sufficient democracy in Iraq in its interventions of 2003.

2- Political instability and internal conflict:

Iraq is ethnically a varied nation, which includes Kurds, Shia and Sunni Arabs, Assyrian and Kildan, and Turkman. However, this diversity generated political instability after the removal of Saddam Hussein. This division of Iraq's policy became impossible to discover the impact of Iraq's political struggles between Maliki as a prime minister and his challengers (Cordesman and Khazai, 2013). In this regard, the division between Sunnis, Shias and Kurds could importantly "complicate the future development of Iraq's present fields, much less its proven and unproven reserves"(Cordesman, 2003: p.547). Thus, conflict accelerated inside Iraq in the post Saddam period between Sunnis, Shia and Kurds. Likewise, the danger of the civil war is still a serious threat to Iraq and the region (Cordesman and Khazai, 2013). The fragmentation of the Iraqi country during the capture and its invasion by challenging political groups, makes a difficult situation in Iraq. Therefore, it was difficult to recognize that who is conserving and who is threatening the recognized political demand (Dixon, 2009). In addition, there was violence and conflict into Iraq after 2003. Therefore the invasion of Iraq had a harmful impact on Iraqi society. As a result, Iraq's stability achievements stay fragile, and the future of Iraq is uncertain and there was much violence (al-Sheikh, Sky, 2011). It is thought that, Iraq cannot succeed in security, creating stability and providing a better life for civilians due to the increase level of violence (Cordesman and Khazai, 2013). Thus, According to Dodge (2012: p107) after 2003, Iraq involved in a violent civil war because of instability. Therefore, after changing the regime, there were weaknesses in Iraq; for example, the dissolution of the Iraqi military and the weakness of troops (Dodge, 2012: p48). However, in 2007, the operation thrown was very successful to remove the violence from Iraq's streets and brought much security to many parts in Baghdad to end the violence, which had driven Iraq into civil war (Dodge, 2012: p107). Additionally, Smith argues that the use of massive force was ineffective because it led to outbreak of a conflict in Iraq (Smith, 2006: p323). Hence, it did not solve any

political problems. Despite this, the tactical utility of force contains deployment and employment of power towards political objectives (Duyvesteyn, 2008). Nouri al-Maliki the Prime Minister in Iraq (20th of May 2006- 14th of August 2014) has continued to strengthen his power. In this regard Sunni political groups have tried to weaken him because he is as a threat for them. Their activities and political conflicts lead to increase violence across Iraq, political instability and important security challenges. (Cordesman and Khazai, 2013). Therefore, it is true that the violence in Iraq is the consequence of conflicts between Iraqi political powers. This led to increase terrorism and authoritarianism through rising violence by both Sunni and Shi'ite terrorist groups at the side of Iraqi politics (Cordesman and Khazai, 2013). Therefore, in early 2011 others saw a harmful tendency. Despite this, according to a report on August 20, 2012 by CFR that, "violence has fallen to its lowest level since 2003" (Cordesman and Khazai, 2013: p15). However, Michael Knights of the Washington Institute states that Just in January 2012, Iraq had suffered mass-casualty attacks (Cordesman and Khazai, 2013).

It is argued that the use of force created a dividing country that led to bring civil war between different nations. For example, Sunnis are fighting Shias and the Shi'ite majority are controlling the power. Likewise, Kurds and Shias are not in agreement about Kirkuk. Therefore, the US use of force did not solve any political problems and the US failed to reduce internal conflict in Iraq through means of force. This is supported that by (Olsen, 2011) who claimed that such violence created a lack of relationship among the people of towards Iraq.

On the other hand, the Iraq's war faced with a huge cost of military casualties (Olsen, 2011). Since 2003 the costs for the invasion of Iraq especially for spending in military operations have been increased. Therefore the costs include finance for military operations, deployments and logistics of troops, organization of National reserves, food and materials, training of Iraqi militaries and military weapons (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2006). Furthermore, the costs for military operation, security, embassy and reconstruction have been increasing during the war, for example, from 2003 it was increased by around 20%, \$4.4 Billion to \$7.1 Billion (Stiglitz, Bilmes, 2006). Moreover, the Iraq war spent a lot of money on the damaged equipment. The costs were increased for conscripting, disability and the medical treatment for those veterans who injured (Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2006). Thus, the total cost of the American war exceeded trillion dollars. In addition, the cost to human life was the essential part for the USA and also the cost of its soft power was significant. Thus, the cost of the war for America was 3 trillions of dollars (Antic, 2013) that can have negative effect on military and economy (members of the Iraq War Inquiry Group, 2012).

3- Kurdish Issues:

Kurds in Iraq have their semi-autonomous area. Green Line is the informal border between them. The Kurds have their own government and parliament and their own militia named the Peshmerga. The Peshmerga helped the US to fight Saddam in both areas, Kurdish region and south of the Green Line in April 2003. After removing Saddam, Kurds established Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) (Senor, 2009).

There is no practical way to describe the levels of violence in Iraq that run from terrorism to insurgency and to civil conflict. The basic pressures that lead to a main civil war is that the conflicts between Arab and Kurd have created very limited violence if compared to the conflict between Arab Sunni and Shi'ite have shaped major tensions. Therefore, at the same time, the information available do not recognise between Sunni vs. Shi'ite violence and intra-Sunni and intra-Shi'ite violence. Overall, intra- Sunni violence was a main reason of efforts by the Iraqi's sons to decrease the level of violence in Iraq from 2007 to 2009 (Cordesman and Khazai, 2013).

In addition, the tensions between Kurds and Arab, and the central government and KRG have not still been a serious violence, but it may be a threat for the future. They can reach main compromises to decrease violence and bring security and stability. (Cordesman and Khazai, 2013).What is more, Iraq faces a potentially serious issues due to the level of pressure between Arab and Kurds, and between the Arab who control the central government and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), that could change the whole pattern of future violence in Iraq. Therefore, since the establishment of the Kurdish security region after the first Gulf War, the trends of violence between Arab and Kurds have been limited. However, since 2004, it is clear that the conflict could lead to civil war in terms of dominance of region, the level of autonomy for the KRG, control of security power and distribution of Iraq's oil export incomes and petroleum resources (Cordesman and Khazai, 2013). However, there is an escalation of conflict between Arabs and Kurds. These tensions have related to the issue of Kirkuk because from the Kurds' standpoint, Kirkuk had a Kurdish majority. Therefore, Kirkuk and other near parts were "disputed territories". For the national government the oil of Kirkuk is a huge concern. From the Kurdish point of view, "oil is part of a broader KRG strategy to draw international pressure on Baghdad to grant further Kurdish autonomy" (Senor, 2009).

4- The escalation of violence and insurgency:

The use of force was ineffective by the US Army because evidence proves that insurgency and violence was generated after the Iraqi invasion in 2003. Burton and Nagal state that the US did many things in Iraq in March without any doctrine, training and planning for opposing insurgency because there was weakness of counterinsurgency preparation in the United States military, especially the issues of Iraq became worse after Saddam Hussein (Burton and Nagal, 2008).

From 2004 to 2006 the war in Iraq shows the strategy of the utility of force was obviously understood by the lower positions (Duyvesteyn 2008). According to Jim Jeffrey (cited in Burton and Nagl, 2008) in September 2005, the US military was not sufficiently implementing a plan for victory. The process of insurgency was hard to be controlled. Therefore, the reconstruction of policy and economy was not going well. The national strategy for supporting Iraq and for reconstruction was successfully a plan by the US military to operate. But, infrastructure security was a big issue hindering its effective implementation (Burton and Nagl, 2008).Furthermore, between 2004 and 2006, there were considerable developments in US military

counterinsurgency processes but the strategy was problematic. Developing the insurgency and violence in Iraq encouraged America to make an effective counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq by 2007 (Burton and Nagal, 2008).

It is believed that according to Burton and Nagal (2008), the strategy of counterinsurgency principle in Iraq was improved by America but it was ineffective in Iraq's security by the end of 2006. Therefore, the strategy of American military was not to defeat insurgency, it was to work on bringing security to Iraq. The Bush administration tried to show this strategy for developing counterinsurgency and to emphasize victory (Burton and Nagl, 2008). However, the period after 2010 has not been a fight against terrorism or extremism. It has been the outcome of Iraq's failure in terms of political leaders to make a real governance. These facts are critical because they notify that there is no measure of success counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in order to bring Iraq into permanent stability or remove its violence (Cordesman and Khazai, 2013). Moreover, military force in counterinsurgency was to capture the motivation of people in order to bring security which has an important utility but there is no shortcut to success in terms of counterinsurgency (Burton and Nagl, 2008). The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was firstly conventional but after that it was transformed into counter-insurgency campaigns (Dixon, 2009). In counterinsurgency, military power is an essential utility to capture the will of the people through security. Terrorist attacks have increased on a large-scale and the threat on the regional countries and global security escalated because of the terrorists inside Iraq and their threat on other countries (Burton and Nagal, 2008).

The war in Iraq by the US government was as a war against terrorism particularly against al-Qaida. According to the Iraq study group report "Al-Qaida is responsible only for a small portion of violence in Iraq" (Antic, 2009: p102). Therefore, this report argues that "Al-Qaida in Iraq is now largely Iraqi-run and composed of Sunni Arabs" (Antic, 2009: p102). In addition, terrorist groups of Sunni and Shi'ite in Iraq often focus on a high level attacks or efforts to control region or increase impact through violence. In addition, according to many experts that the Sunni terrorist groups and particularly A- Qa'ida try to extend their attacks in Shi'ite and Kurdish territory to show that Shi'ite or Kurdish region is not safe. (Cordesman and Khazai, 2013). Therefore, the government of Iraq observed with doubt Iraqis people who joined al-Qaeda and targeted innocent people just to change sides and claim to be aggressive against al-Qaeda (al-Sheikh, and Sky, 2011). On the other hand, insurgents, who combat against external invasion is a suitable term for these troops than terrorists. According to the report, many attacks on Americans related to the Sunni insurgency. 99.9% of the insurgency are Iraqis and a very small percentage are foreign fighters (Antic, 2009). The Sunni people more understood with the insurgency. Therefore, many insurgent groups are formed by the Sunnis, also control of the city of Falluja in Anbar province was assumed by insurgents (al-Sheikh and Sky, 2011). Thus, the Sunnis people gave a strong support to the insurgents (Antic, 2009). In this regard, there are many reasons for Iraqi violence. "violence is more a symptom than a cause of Iraq's problems" (Cordesman and Khazai, 2013: p5)). Therefore, there is a development

between 2007 and 2009 but it does not mean that Iraq had removed the threat from violent Shi'ite and Sunni activities, and aggressive between national and sects groups. (Cordesman and Khazai, 2013). For developing the capability of Iraq and to establish the security in this country, it is important to carry out a campaign to defuse the insurgency and to defeat the terrorists because violence in Iraq was into the biggest cause of instability (Burton and Nagl, 2008).

In Iraq there is a high level of the threat of increased sectarian violence by opposition groups. Some of these groups have been working for long time in Iraq; for example, the Islamic State of Iraq and Al Qaida in Iraq Cordesman and Khazai, 2013). By 2006, the pressures between the nationalist insurgency and al-Qaeda became increased (al-Sheikh and Sky, 2011). Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was a leader of al-Qaida in Iraq in 2004. He was the Jordanian terrorist. He was against the Shi'ite civilians and American forces (Burton and Nagl, 2008). However, there are other groups that created recently such as militias on the Sunni side who control governorates and other groups on the Shia side such as AsaibAhl al-Haq and Kata'ibHizbullah. Sunni armed opposition groups have established their ability to adjust tactics and operations in terms of sustaining continuous stream of attacks in a high operational speed, keeping constant tension on the Iraqi security powers, testing their abilities and rendering problematic the conduct of counterinsurgency operations" (Cordesman and Khazai, 2013). What is more, the Iraqi state is umbrella for groups of a number Iraqi insurgency organization which established on October 15, 2006. The group is supported and collected by different groups of insurgency. Therefore, these groups consist of "its predecessor, the Mujahideen Shura Council, Al-Qaeda, Jeish al-Fatiheen, Jund al- Sahaba, Katbiyan Ansar Al-Tawhid wal Sunnah, Jeish al-Taiifa al-Mansoura, and other Sunni groups". The purpose is to create a caliphate in the Sunni controlled areas of Iraq (Cordesman and Khazai, 2013: p8).

It could be argued that the US use of force was not utilised efficiently because it generated violence and insurgency rather than peace and stability. Likewise, it is clear that changing regime led to some terrorist groups particularly Al Qaida. Therefore insurgency could have negative effect on the security of Iraq. In addition removing Saddam Hussein from power created many terrorist groups and insurgency in Iraq. Thus this led to increasing violence and poor relationship between citizens over the war. In this regard, the US did many things inside Iraq but the process of counterinsurgency was not successful and it faced many issues that was difficult to control it.

On the other hand, Petraeus (cited in Dodge, 2012) states that it was essential that there were four areas in Iraq to be a surge; for example, the military, the civilian side of the US administration, the Iraqi powers and Iraqi political will (Dodge, 2012: p83). Despite this, during 2007 the US policy in Iraq was involved in a two phase military operation. The first step was the Baghdad security plan which is 'enforcing the law'. This looked at the counterinsurgency of military and also focused on the security of people inside and around Baghdad. The second stage, named Phantom Thunder and Phantom Strike, which was to concentrate on Baghdad's residential and surrounding areas, but more importantly it was presented as conservative military search to

destroy missions especially in those places where large number of US military services were positioned to eliminate Radical Sunni groups (Dodge, 2012: p83). The surge started on 14 February 2007, according to Emma Sky (cited in Dodge, 2012: p84) "population protection became the driving mantra of the command environment". The plan was to bring great levels of the security to small parts of Baghdad and after that it was extended (Dodge, 2012: p84). Furthermore, the second phase of the surge was began in June 2007, by using an extra conventional mass-military action. Odierno organised his troops in two concentric rings around Baghdad in order to break the groups of insurgency. Then, in the biggest military action, Phantom Thunder and Phantom Strike were started to stop insurgents groups working outside Baghdad (Dodge, 2012: p86).

From 2007 to 2008, the surge did not have the influence in changing the condition of Iraq. In addition, since 2007 the situations in Iraq have developed, but these changes were not due to the surge. When the surge began in Iraq, the Bush government's more lofty aims of changing Iraq into a constant, multinational democracy had become largely rhetorical. (Betts, Desch and Feaver, 2011). The strategy of surge and counterinsurgency was supported by Keane and continued to involve surge supporters within the government. (Marsh, 2012). Surge supporters argue that the security of people was necessary for permanent political stability and improvement in Iraq. Therefore, counterinsurgency strategy as a main factor for Iraq's stability was particularly supported by Generals Keane, Petraeus, and Odierno. It is argued that by surge challengers that the United States could only attain Iraq's stability by organising effective and self-sufficient Iraqi security powers. (Marsh, 2012).

However, the surge was a failure strategy because Iraq stays a violent place part. Therefore, in any situation, Bush does not justify credit for the surge's activities because he had to make a decision. In the meanwhile, he justifies responsibility for the strategy that did not work. Desch (cited in Betts, Desch and Feaver, 2011) argues that in 2007 strategy of surge was irrelevant because in Iraq the condition of security was improving without surge. He recently mentions that at the end of 2006 the security condition was improving. In this regard, creating the extra troops was irrelevant (Betts, Desch and Feaver, 2011). Desch also treats the surge in violent counterterrorism process as an "alternative" clarification for the development in security, rather than "seeing this activity as integral to the overall surge" (Betts, Desch and Feaver, 2011: p193). Similarly, he states that in the summer of 2007, the surge did not participate to Moqtada al-Sadr's decision to announce a truce. Despite this claims that the surge in special actions attacks against the powers of Sadr no suspicion played a role (Betts, Desch and Feaver, 2011). It is believe that by the Chiefs that the surge would not succeed in attaining America's political and army goals in Iraq. In fact it would be counterproductive. "The Pentagon has cautioned that a modest surge could lead to more attacks by al-Qaeda, provide more targets for Sunni insurgents and fuel the jihadist appeal for more foreign fighters to flock to Iraq to attack US troops, the officials said. Thus, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) believed that the surge would inhibit security transfer and potentially worsen the violence in Iraq" (Marsh, 2012: p420).

It seems that the purpose of the surge was to improve security power. Therefore, the surge was a key factor to reduce the violence, to provide security to Iraq and to break terrorist groups and insurgency. Hence, the surge failed because Bush's strategy to support surge was ineffective. It is evident that the surge was not successful in Iraq and it faced many issues such as escalation of violence and instability.

The war in Iraq is a significant event for removing Saddam Hussein from power. Furthermore, an American strategy built around the principle of regime change would have used the utility of force against Iraq to change the regime of Iraq. Although, according to many studies the USA sought to support democracy in Iraq but in fact they did not bring any real democracy to Iraq. The USA attacked Iraq not because of democracy or destruction of mass weapons, the reason was to get natural resources. Consequently, after invasion of Iraq the situation became even worse to promote and install democracy due to internal conflict and violence.

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The utility of force was ineffective because when the war started, it led to increase the insurgency and terrorist groups, which has risen within the Iraqi society. Therefore, Sunni insurgents in Iraq continue to strike in their tactic in order to support the insurgency. Thus, increasing violence and insurgency in Iraq cannot bring security or stability to Iraqi society. Although, the US conducted counter insurgency operations in Iraq but the strategy was not successful in 2006 and the strategy of counterinsurgency was weak. In addition, terrorist groups especially al-Qaida tried to expand their attacks in a large scale. Consequently, the process of insurgency and terrorist groups was hard to control by the USA. On the other hand, there were two stages of starting surge in Iraq. The first one was on 14 February 2007, the main reason was to bring security into Iraq. The second one was in June 2007 in order to break the groups of terrorists and insurgency. However, the strategy of surge was failed because of increasing violence. Therefore, surge was not enough to develop security and stability in Iraq.

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کورتیا فەکولینێ

شەری عێراقی یی سال (2003) ی دەیتە هژمارتن رویدانه کا گرنگ بو ژ نافرنا (صدام حسین) ژ سەرکۆرسیا دەسەلاتداریی، لەورا سترتیجیەتا ویلایەتین ئیگرتی یین ئەمریکی هاتیە دانان ل سەر بنگەهی ب کارئینانا هیزی بو بجه ئینانا ئەفی ستراتیجیەتی. و ئەرکی ئەفی هیزی دی پەیدا کرنا دیموکراسیەتی بیت ل عێراقی ل دویف وان فەکولینین هاتینە ئەنجامدان ل بنگەهین بریارا ئەمریکی ل سەر بارودوخی عێراقی.

ویلایەتین ئیگرتی یین ئەمرکی دەست ب داگیر کرنا عێراقی کر ب بەهانه یا ژ نافرنا چەکی کوم کوژ، لی مەرەما سەرەکی یا گریدای بوو ب گەشتنا کەرەستە یین سڕوشتی و ژێدەرین کاندازی بوو، لەورا د ئەنجامدا پشستی داگیر کرنا عێراقی ئەو دیموکراسیەتا باس لی دهاته کرن جهی خو د ناخا عێراقی دا نه دیتە فە، بەلکو بەروفاژی ئەفی چەندی بارودوخی ئەمنی یی عێراقی بەرەف پاژفە چوو، ژ ئەگەری پەیدا بوونا هەفرکی دناقبەرا نەتەوه و ئول و مەزەه یین ژیک جوودا ل عێراقی.

ب کارئینانا هیزی ژلایی ویلایەتین ئیگرتی یین ئەمریکی فە کاریگەریە کا نەرینی پەیدا کر ل سەر ئاستین سیاسی و ئابووری و جفاکی ل عێراقی، بو ئەگەری پەیدا بوونا هەفرکیا سیاسی و تیکچوونا بارودوخی ئەمنی و گەشە کرنا هەفرکیا مەزەه بی دناقبەرا شیعه و سوننه یان دا، هەرەسا گهورینا سڕوشتی هەفرکی دناقبەرا دەسەلاتداریا بەغدا و مللەتی کورد بەرەف هەفرکیا رەگەزی د ناقبەرا مللەتی عەرەب و کورد دا، زێدەباری پەیدا بوونا مەترسیا تاک رەویی د دەسەلاتداریی دا، نەخاسمە ئەو پینگا فین هاتینە هافین ژلایی سەروک وەزیرین عێراقی (نوری المالکی) فە.

ژبەر ئەفان ئەگەری ل سەری دیارکری هەو کا بەرفەرە یا توند و تیژی ل عێراقی پەیدا بوو دژی هەبوونا هیزین ئەمریکی کو ژلایی کروپین سوننی یین توندرو فە د هاتنە ب ریقبەرن، زێدەبەری هەندە ک گروپین دی یین توند رو یین شیعی کو ژلایی ئیرانی فە پشتگیری لی دهاته کرن، و زیانە کا مەزن یا گیانی و مادی گەهاندیە هیزین لەشکەری یین ئەمریکی، و کارتیکن ل سەر بریارا سیاسی و بارودوخی ئابووری یی ویلایەتین ئیگرتی یین ئەمریکا کریه، و عێراق بەرەف پیلە کا توند و تیژی بریه کو هەتا ئەفرۆکە ژ ی یا بەردەوامه.

ملخص البحث

يعد الحرب في العراق حدث مهم للاطاحة بصدام حسين عن السلطة. لذلك فان الاستراتيجية الامريكية بنيت على مبدأ ان تغير النظام يتطلب استخدام القوة ضد العراق. وبالاعتماد على الكثير من الدراسات سعت الولايات المتحدة الامريكية من خلال هذه المهمة الى دعم الديمقراطية في العراق ولكنها لم تجلب اي ديمقراطية حقيقية للعراق. لقد غزت الولايات المتحدة العراق ليس لجلب الديمقراطية او تدمير اسلحة الدمار الشامل كما كان يعتقد انذاك، ولكن السبب الرئيس كان الوصول الى الموارد الطبيعية. ونتيجة لذلك، وعقب اجتياح العراق تدهور الوضع اكثر فيما يخص بناء و تعزيز الديمقراطية بسبب الصراع الداخلي والعنف الذي نشب بين الأطراف المختلفة.

ادى استخدام الولايات المتحدة للقوة الى مردود عكسي بسبب العواقب السلبية لهذه الاستخدام على المكونات العراقية في مختلف الأصعدة. لقد كان استخدام الولايات المتحدة للقوة غير مجدي لانها ادت الى عدم استقرار سياسي وفقدان الامن بعد عام 2003 و بدأ الصراع داخل العراق بين الشيعة والسنة والكرد، اضيف الى ذلك استمر المالكى (رئيس الوزراء العراقي انذاك) بتثبيت سلطته الفردية داخل العراق، مما ادى الى نشوب الصراع بين القوى السياسية المختلفة. وكذلك لم ينتهي الصراع بين مكونات العراق خلال فترة الحرب وما بعدها. اما الصراع بين العرب والكرد فانه محدود اذا ما قورن بالصراع بين السنة والشيعة. وقد شكل هذا الصراع تهديدا جديا وخاصة فيما يخص مسالة عائدة مدينة كركوك والنفط.

لذلك احاطت المصاعب وموجة من العنف بالعراق والقوات الأمنية العراقية، وتعرضت القوات الأمريكية للخسائر من ناحية العمليات العسكرية و البشرية وكان لهذه الخسائر تاثير سلبي على الاقتصاد الأمريكي بصورة عامة. كان استخدام القوة غير مجديا لان الحرب افضى الى زيادة المجاميع الارهابية والتمرد داخل المجتمع العراقي. ولحد الآن يواصل المكون السني بايقاع الضربات بنهجهم لدعم التمرد في مختلف المناطق السنية. لذا فانه لايمكن لتصاعد العنف والتمرد في العراق ان يجلب الامن والاستقرار للمجتمع العراقي. رغم ان الولايات المتحدة قامت بعمليات مكافحة التمرد في العراق الا ان استراتيجية مكافحة الارهاب لم تكن ناجحة بل كانت ضعيفة في 2006. اضيف الى ذلك حاولت المجاميع الارهابية وخاصة تنظيم القاعدة ان تصعد من هجماتها على نطاق واسع. ونتيجة لذلك كان من الصعب على الولايات المتحدة السيطرة على التمرد وعلى المجاميع الارهابية. ومن ناحية اخرى، كانت هناك مرحلتان لبدية التصعيد في العراق، اولاهما كانت في 14 شباط من عام 2007 وكان السبب الرئيس هو جلب الديمقراطية بالقوة للعراق. والثانية كانت في حزيران من عام 2007، وذلك لمحاولة القضاء على المجاميع المسلحة، الا ان استراتيجية التصعيد فشلت لانها ادت الى زيادة العنف. لذا فان التصعيد لم يكن كافيا لتوفير الامن والاستقرار في العراق بل على العكس من ذلك سلب الأمن و الاستقرار، وادى الى نشوب صراع على اساس عرقى و طائفي في عموم العراق.